

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Deputy Asst. Director for National Estimates      DATE: 14 January 1955  
THRU : Assistant Director for Operations *g/m*  
FROM : Chief, FBID/00  
  
SUBJECT: NIE 31-5

Attached review of propaganda bearing on Yugoslav relations  
with the Soviet Bloc was prepared in support of subject estimate.



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Enclosure:  
"Yugoslav-Soviet Relations in  
Radio Propaganda"

cc: AD/CI

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YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS IN RADIO PROPAGANDA

Summary

1. Since Soviet and Satellite media completed at the end of last summer the progressive elimination of anti-Yugoslav propaganda from their output they have begun to use a moderate amount of material favorable to Yugoslavia, reporting items of economic and cultural progress and exploiting Yugoslav leaders' statements which coincide with Soviet policies. Broadcasts repeat Saburov's 7 November assertion that Yugoslav-Soviet estrangement was advantageous only to the enemies of both countries--the enemies of peace. The Soviet radio has forborne to exploit a rich source of anti-Western material, the Djilas-Dedijer case, in its effort to avoid intrusion into Yugoslav internal affairs.
2. The initially skeptical Yugoslav reaction to these overtures remains cautious, but has come to the point of recognizing the "good will" behind the "constructive proposal" of Saburov's 7 November speech. The Belgrade radio now rarely criticizes Soviet policy without adding compensatory criticism of the West, and does not feel obliged so to compensate for critical comment on Western policies. Tito's own speeches insist that Yugoslavia is only accepting Soviet initiative toward improving relations and has no intention of joining either camp.

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YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS IN RADIO PROPAGANDAA. Bloc Overtures

1. The October Revolution speech of Soviet Deputy Premier M. Z. Saburov, which made a frank bid for closer ties with Yugoslavia and boldly identified Soviet and Yugoslav interests, represents the upper limit reached to date in Bloc propaganda for friendlier relations with Yugoslavia. A change in Bloc propaganda on Yugoslavia had been perceptible as early as mid-1953 in the moderation and finally the cessation of attacks on Tito personally and in the softening of the hostile tone characteristic of Bloc comment since the break. By August 1954, Moscow had reached the point of limiting its broadcasts on the signing of the Balkan Pact--sharply condemned earlier in the year--to a few factual reports, scrupulously avoiding criticism of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs, in turn, have officially confirmed that the anti-Yugoslav campaign in East Europe has ended. (Bebler, 29 December 1954).
2. A more positive phase in the new Bloc treatment of Yugoslavia commenced in the fall of 1954 and was highlighted by Moscow's coverage of Tito's speech at Ostrožno (19 September), the first favorable treatment of a Yugoslav leader's speech since the break. Since Moscow had passed up earlier opportunities to exploit the Yugoslav position on foreign affairs, the treatment of the Ostrožno speech represented a new development in Soviet policy rather than merely the expedient use of material from any source to support the Soviet European security proposals. The portions of Tito's speech publicized by Moscow made it appear that the Yugoslav President's remarks were in harmony with the Soviet position. Caution was manifest, however, in that Bloc broadcasts made no independent comment on the speech. Treatment of the Ostrožno speech laid down the pattern for subsequent handling of Yugoslav statements on foreign affairs. At the same time Bloc radios began reporting favorable items on Yugoslav economic and cultural affairs to domestic audiences and derogatory references were completely avoided.
3. Bloc propaganda has not gone beyond the line laid down in Saburov's October Revolution speech, but his remarks have been incorporated in subsequent broadcasts. A Kraminov PRAVDA article on the Yugoslav Day of the Republic (broadcast 29 November), for example, repeated Saburov's assertion that Yugoslav-Soviet estrangement was advantageous only to the enemies of both countries--the enemies of peace.

In addition to utilizing Yugoslav statements as propaganda support for the Soviet position, Moscow continues to concentrate in broadcasts to Yugoslavia a disproportionate amount of European security propaganda stressing the dangers of German militarism and extolling the Soviet proposals. During the first three quarters of 1954 the Yugoslavs and the more directly affected West European audiences as a whole each heard one-third more Soviet commentaries on European security than on all other topics. Reminders to the Yugoslavs of their fate in two world wars against the Germans were reiterated in the Soviet note replying to the Yugoslav rejection of its invitation to attend the Moscow conference.

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4. Neither Moscow nor the Satellites took note of the initial stages of the Djilas controversy in Yugoslavia in the winter of 1953. Moscow's Home Service news programs have reported recent developments in the Djilas-Dedijer affair, but without comment. Moscow has carried a factual report of Dedijer's expulsion from office and a French press agency version of the Djilas interview in the NEW YORK TIMES (including his criticism of the Yugoslav system); and a TASS account noted, without amplification, that Djilas and Dedijer had been charged with offering their services to "hostile foreign powers." Home Service excerpts of Kardelj's speech at the Bosnian Congress, the first speech by a Yugoslav leader other than Tito to be noted, include a brief account of his sharp criticism of Djilas and Dedijer, but focus primarily on his advocacy of coexistence and normalized relations with the Bloc. Satellite transmitters have followed Moscow's lead in reporting on the case without comment. The Bloc's effort to avoid the appearance of interference in Yugoslav internal affairs is particularly striking in this case, inasmuch as Yugoslav comment on the case provides ample anti-Western material for Soviet exploitation.

#### B. Yugoslav Reactions

1. Belgrade's reaction to Soviet overtures remains cautious, but Yugoslav propaganda has become progressively less critical in comments on the USSR since Tito's Ostrožno speech. Initially, Yugoslav comment on Bloc bids for normalization of relations stressed the inadequacy of words as a substitute for deeds. Belgrade summarily dismissed Satellite radio overtures as late as the spring of 1954 as empty phrases which required the backing of tangible demonstrations of good will. Such statements have now been eliminated from Yugoslav media.
2. Belgrade reported Moscow's approval of Tito's Ostrožno speech as a victory and a justification of Yugoslav policy, but questioned Soviet motives. One Belgrade broadcast said the Soviets "unrealistically" thought to exploit the speech. Belgrade also presented the passage in Saburov's speech as a vindication of Yugoslav policy and in addition saw "good will" in what it termed Saburov's "constructive proposal." Radio Zagreb, however, commented that "the Soviet leader appears to have rather freely bracketed the enemies of the Soviet Union with those of Yugoslavia."
3. Belgrade continues occasionally to broadcast critical analysis of the Bloc system to its domestic audience but the comment has been less bitter and more infrequent than during the Stalin era. In broadcasts to the USSR and Satellites criticism of internal Bloc affairs and intra-Bloc relations has virtually disappeared, although Belgrade continues to affirm the correctness of the Yugoslav position. In comment on international relations, the Yugoslavs now rarely criticize aspects of Soviet policy without adding compensatory criticism of the West, a delicacy not equally manifest in their treatment of the foreign policies of Western powers. Belgrade repeatedly criticizes the West's policy of "bloc" formation, its stress on strictly military West European unification, U.S. policy on admission of China to the United Nations and on Formosa, and Western failure to see anything new in Soviet policy.

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4. Belgrade continues to deplore the lack of trust between Washington and Moscow and welcomes what it calls evidences of the "narrowing" of the gap between East and West. It expressed satisfaction with "the encouraging signs" it found in Malenkov's New Year interview and criticized Washington for saying there is nothing new in the Soviet Premier's statement. "Not only do they refuse to accept the tolerant tone which permeates Malenkov's statement, but they persist in their old ways," one broadcast said, citing a UP report on U.S. bases in Spain. Yugoslav comment similarly saw in President Eisenhower's State of the Union message an expression of faith in the possibility of peaceful coexistence and criticized Moscow's "completely negative" reaction to the speech, but took the occasion to recall U.S. reaction to the Malenkov statement.
5. The Djilas-Dedijer case has occasioned the strongest Yugoslav criticism of the West in recent months. Belgrade castigates the Western press both for its involvement in the case and for its treatment of it. Djilas and Dedijer are charged with collaborating with "certain Western circles" in order to damage Yugoslav prestige abroad at precisely the time of Tito's visit to India and Burma. This charge has been broadened to the assertion that it is all part of a plot to drive Yugoslavia into one bloc or another, suggesting that Djilas and Dedijer and perhaps other elements in Yugoslavia oppose Belgrade's reception of Soviet overtures.
6. Tito's speeches touching on Soviet-Yugoslav relations have been more pointed than routine Yugoslav propaganda in several respects:
  - a. He has repeatedly emphasized that the initiative for normalization came from Moscow and has cited this as proof of Stalin's wrong policy and as a vindication of Yugoslavia in connection with the 1948 break. Addressing the Indian Parliament, he said that the present Soviet leadership has admitted that Yugoslavia had been wrongly treated and condemned in 1948. Tito said that such admissions and others "which will one day be known" have contributed to improving relations. In a shouting speech at Kopar (21 November) he said the Soviet leaders "are now saying this themselves, though not in sufficiently clear terms, yet clearly enough for those who know something of these things to see who was responsible."
  - b. Tito has insisted that the improvement of relations with the USSR is the result of a change in the domestic and foreign policy "which is being brought about by the present leaders of the Soviet Union." He has said, however, that Soviet leaders are themselves unwilling to admit that change "despite the fact that this could, in my opinion, be only to their benefit."
  - c. It is significant that Tito stated these views before the Indian Parliament. He is apparently anxious to convince the non-Communist world that the Soviet-Yugoslav normalization has not come about through any change in Yugoslav policy. He has given repeated assurances that normalization of relations with the Bloc would not affect Yugoslavia's friendly relations with the West and has on several occasions expressed his appreciation of Western aid during difficult times.

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- d. At the same time, Tito has sharply criticized those who see nothing but traps in the Soviet bids and has given his assurance that Yugoslavia knows how "to distinguish between a maneuver and a positive step." Tito has gone further than routine Yugoslav propaganda in his suggestion that Belgrade would be willing to cooperate with the Soviets not only economically but, "where necessary, politically--when we see it is correct to do so."
- e. At Kopar (21 November) Tito set the following limits to Yugoslavia's relations with both East and West:

Accordingly, those in the West...who do not like us as a socialist country must be aware once and for all that the illusion is futile that one day we may renounce socialism and join some capitalist camp. There can be no question of this. On the other hand, it must be clear to the Eastern side that we have no intention of returning to the position which we were in until 1948, or rather that position in which they wanted us to be.... There is no question of that.

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